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changes	can	be	observed.	Necrotic	changes	(for	example,	karyolysis,	karyorhexis,	loss	of	structure	in	the	cytoplasm)	“are	the	features	of	a	cell’s	cadaver,	whatever	the	mechanism	of	the	cell’s	death,	be	it	ischaemia,	heat,	toxins,	mechanical	trauma,	or	even	apoptosis”	(Majno	&	Joris	1995,	11).	This	has	actually	been	the	traditional	meaning	of	necrosis,	i.e.	it	refers	to	changes	in	tissues	that	are	visible	even	without	a	microscope	and	as	such	occur	after	cell	death. 	3	 This	point	has	been	emphasised	also	by	other	authors.	So,	according	to	Kanduc	et	al.	(2002,	167),	it	is	“scienti?ically	unjusti?ied”	and	“unsound”	to	compare	apoptosis	to	necrosis,	as	apoptosis	is	a	process	that	leads	to	cell	death,	whereas	necrosis	refers	to	changes	that	occur	to	cells	after	they	die.	In	general	then,	we	should	distinguish	between	the	processes	that	a	dying	cell	undergoes	(e.g.	apoptosis)	and	the	end	result	of	these	processes,	which	is	the	dead	cell.	‘Necrosis’	should	then	refer	to	already	dead	cells	and	tissues	and	the	changes	that	occur	after	cell	death	(see	also	Fink	&	Cookson	2005).	This	usage	of	the	term	‘necrosis’	is	precisely	the	one	suggested	by	the	Committee	on	the	Nomenclature	of	Cell	Death	chartered	by	the	Society	of	Toxicologic	Pathologists	to	make	recommendations	“about	the	use	of	the	terms	‘apoptosis’	and	‘necrosis’	in	toxicity	studies”	(Levin	et	al.	1999,	484).	In	line	with	the	above,	this	Committee	recommended	that	“when	dead	cells	or	tissues	are	observed	in	a	histological	lesion,	‘necrosis’	is	the	appropriate	morphological	diagnosis,	regardless	of	the	pathway	by	which	the	cells	or	tissues	died”	(Levin	et	al.	1999).	They	conclude:	“[t]his	Committee	believes	that	returning	to	the	long-established	histopathological	standard	wherein	the	word	necrosis	denotes	dead	cells	in	a	living	tissue	(regardless	of	their	phenotype)	should	help	to	alleviate	the	confusion	attendant	on	the	notion,	held	by	many,	that	a	dichotomy	exists	between	apoptosis	and	necrosis”	(Levin	et	al.	1999).	Notably,	Sloviter	(2002,	22)	goes	as	far	as	to	note	that	“the	term	necrosis	is	now	virtually	meaningless	because	‘necrotic’	means	nothing	more	than	‘dead’”.			 According	to	Majno	and	Joris,	“the	major	sore	spot	in	the	nomenclature	of	cell	death	is	precisely	the	lack	of	a	suitable	name	for	cell	death	that	occurs	not	by	apoptosis	but	by	some	external	agent”	(Majno	&	Joris	1995,	11).	And	this	is	precisely	the	point:	cell	death	might	have	different	causal	pathways	and	the	difference	between	them	is	not	that	one	(or	some)	of	them	counts	as	a	mechanism	while	the	other	does	not;	rather	the	difference	is	in	how	they	are	described.			 Majno	and	Joris’s	own	suggestion	is	to	characterise	apoptosis	in	contrast	with	a	
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speci?ic	process	of	cell	death	they	call	“oncosis”	(1995,	12).	A	common	non-apoptotic	causal	pathway	that	leads	to	cell	death	is	when	groups	of	cells	die	of	ischaemia	(ischaemic	necrosis).	During	the	causal	pathway	that	leads	to	ischaemic	necrosis	the	cell	swells	and	it	is	in	order	to	capture	this	swelling	process	that	the	authors	propose	‘oncosis’	as	a	term	to	refer	to	this	mechanism.	This	causal	pathway	can	nowadays	be	characterised	in	detail:	reduced	supply	of	oxygen	and	nutrients	leads	to	ATP	depletion,	which	ultimately	results	in	protein	denaturation,	enzymatic	digestion	due	to	damaged	lysosomes	and	loss	of	integrity	of	the	plasma	membrane,	resulting	in	in?lux	of	water	and	calcium	into	the	cell,	leading	to	swelling	and	ultimately	rupture	of	the	cell.	Also,	we	know	that	ischaemia	typically	activates	the	causal	pathway,	but	toxic	agents	can	also	initiate	it.	We	can	then	talk	about	the	mechanism	of	oncosis	in	our	minimal	methodological	sense	of	the	term.	Oncosis	and	apoptosis,	then,	are	two	causal	pathways	(and	hence	mechanisms)	of	cell	death	–by	swelling	and	by	shrinkage,	respectively.		However,	there	might	be	a	way	to	distinguish	apoptosis	from	oncosis	such	that	only	the	former	counts	as	a	mechanism.	We	will	consider	three	distinctions	used	by	researchers	of	cell	death	that	might	be	used	in	order	to	do	this:	i)	processes	of	physiological	vs.	accidental	cell	death,	ii)	processes	of	programmed	vs.	non-programmed	cell	death	and	iii)	active	vs.	passive	processes.	A	term	widely	used	to	describe	a	non-apoptotic,	non-physiological	type	of	cell	death	is	‘accidental	cell	death’.	By	describing	a	process	of	cell	death	as	‘accidental’,	biologists	try	to	capture	the	idea	that,	in	contrast	to	apoptosis,	this	is	not	a	process	that	occurs	under	normal	conditions,	nor	does	it	serve	a	general	homeostatic	function	within	the	organism.	However,	as	Majno	and	Joris	(1995)	note,	apoptosis	can	also	be	induced	by	a	variety	of	‘accidental’	causes	(e.g.	heat,	chemical	agents,	viruses).	Levin	et	al.	also	note	that	“dead	cells	having	the	cytological	features	of	apoptosis	can	occur	in	large	numbers	as	a	pathological	change,	e.g.,	‘single	cell	necrosis’	in	the	liver	and	lymphocyte	necrosis	in	the	thymus,	and	that	these	changes	can	be	induced	by	exogenous	events	such	as	exposure	to	toxicants”	(Levin	et	al.	1999,	485).	So,	the	very	fact	that	apoptosis	can	be	initiated	by	‘accidental	causes’	shows	that	the	right	contrast	here	is	not	between	mechanism	and	non-mechanism,	but	rather	between	physiological	cell	death	and	accidental	cell	death,	where	‘physiological	cell	death’	refers	to	a	process	of	cell	death	that	was	initiated	by	physiological	stimuli.	
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	 What	about	the	programmed	–	non-programmed	distinction?	An	important	point	here	is	that	‘programmed	cell	death’	and	apoptosis	should	not	be	identi?ied;	thus,	the	former	cannot	be	used	to	distinguish	the	latter.	Programmed	cell	death	is	the	phenomenon	where	cells	die	‘on	schedule’,	i.e.	they	are	programmed	to	die	at	a	speci?ic	time.	During	development	of	the	chick,	for	example,	the	morphology	of	the	wing	is	produced	as	a	result	of	the	death	of	groups	of	cells;	there	is	a	‘genetic	clock’	that	determines	when	the	cells	will	die.	But	when	the	time	comes	for	the	cell	to	die,	the	speci?ic	programme	that	determines	the	form	that	cell	suicide	will	take,	is	triggered.	The	particular	form	of	cell	suicide	can	be	apoptosis	(indeed,	very	frequently	it	is),	but	it	need	not	be.	As	Majno	and	Joris	stress:	“The	genetic	programme	of	programmed	cell	death	is	a	clock	specifying	the	time	for	suicide,	whereas	the	genetic	programme	of	apoptosis	speci?ies	the	weapons	(the	means)	to	produce	instant	suicide”	(1995,	11):	the	weapon	is	precisely	what	we	call	the	causal	pathway.	Again,	the	point	here	is	that	one	cannot	use	this	distinction	to	distinguish	apoptosis	as	a	genuine	mechanism.	Biologists,	we	noted	above,	have	characterised	the	contrast	between	processes	of	cell	death	along	the	active-passive	lines:	apoptosis	was	described	as	‘active’	from	the	very	beginning	of	its	introduction,	and	contrasted	with	the	‘passive’	necrosis .	Perhaps	4what	makes	apoptosis	a	mechanism,	then,	is	precisely	that	it	is	an	active	process.	However,	what	does	this	distinction	really	mean?	The	idea	here	seems	to	be	that	in	the	case	of	apoptosis	the	cell	is	itself	involved	in	its	own	demise	(‘cell	suicide’),	whereas	in	the	case	of	oncosis	the	cell	dies	as	a	result	of	some	exogenous	in?luence	(‘cell	murder’).	That	is,	apoptosis	involves	a	‘suicide	programme’	that	is	initiated	under	various	circumstances	and	that	is	genetically	based,	in	the	sense	that	there	exist	speci?ic	genes	that	code	for	various	components	of	the	biochemical	pathway	underlying	the	apoptotic	process	(the	distinctions	regulated	vs.	non-regulated,	ordered	vs.	unordered,	controlled	vs.	non-controlled	appear	to	be	used	in	a	similar	way).		To	make	this	clear,	Sloviter	(2002,	23),	after	describing	the	two	causal	pathways	as	‘active	cell	death’	(ACD)	and	‘passive	cell	death’,	notes	that	ACD	is	active	in	the	sense	that	it	requires	“active	intracellular	processes	for	death	to	result”,	whereas	in	passive	cell	death	“the	cell	plays	no	role	in	its	own	demise”,	that	is,	cell	death	is	“immediate	and	involves	no	cellular	activity”,	the	cause	being	exogenous	to	the	cell	such	as	“rapid	freezing,	aldehyde	?ixation,	heat	denaturation,	and	catastrophic	physical	destruction”.	As	such,	passive	cell	death	is	of	little	interest	since	being	immediate	it	“offers	no	
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therapeutic	window”.	The	important	point	for	us	is	that	this	difference	between	‘active’	and	‘passive’	is	merely	a	difference	concerning	the	details	of	each	causal	pathway.	Hence,	there	is	no	intrinsic	difference	between	the	two	causal	pathways	as	such:	there	is	nothing	particularly	active	in	apoptosis	and	particularly	passive	in	oncosis.	The	signi?icant	difference	from	a	biological	point	of	view	is	that	because	apoptosis	involves	a	‘suicide	programme’,	it	can	serve	a	homeostatic	function,	as	argued	by	Kerr	et	al.	(1972).			 To	avoid	the	insinuation	that	the	use	of	‘active’	and	‘passive’	processes	might	lead	to	views	about	the	ontology	of	causation	and	mechanisms	(e.g.	to	the	distinction	between	entities	and	activities,	as	in	MDC	(2000)),	let	us	see	how	biologists	view	the	active-passive	distinction.	Kanduc	et	al.	say:	“[i]t	is	frequently	assumed	that	the	death	of	cells	can	be	passive.	This	non-biological	point	of	view	on	cell	death	ignores	the	role	of	cell	death	in	cell	development	and	adaptation.	It	cannot	be	assumed	that	‘ordinary’	cell	death	or	‘necrosis’	is	a	passive	process	while	the	presumed	special	form	of	cell	death,	‘apoptosis’	is	active.	Both	the	ante-mortem	and	postmortem	changes	are	active	since	both	
are	enzyme-catalysed	biochemical	reactions”	(Kanduc	et	al.	2002,	167-168,	emphasis	added).	
6.	Is	Mechanism	more	than	the	Causal	Pathway?	Hence,	apoptosis	and	oncosis	can	both	be	considered	mechanisms	in	the	truly	minimal	sense:	they	are	both	causal	pathways	that	produce	a	result	(apoptotic	and	ischaemic	necrosis,	respectively).	However,	the	history	of	programmed	cell	death	and	apoptosis	during	the	last	60	years	might	be	used	to	argue	that	in	biological	practice	what	counts	as	a	biological	mechanism	cannot	just	be	a	matter	of	identifying	a	speci?ic	causal	pathway.	Apoptosis	seems	to	be	a	special	kind	of	causal	process	with	distinctive	features	that	deserves	to	be	labeled	a	mechanism.	This	can	even	been	seen	in	biologists’	description	of	apoptosis	as	a	‘mechanism	of	cell	death’.		 Note	that	the	reason	apoptosis	became	a	central	biological	mechanism	is	not	due	to	some	feature	internal	to	the	sequence	of	events	that	constitutes	the	apoptotic	pathway,	but	rather	due	to	features	that	are	external	to	the	pathway	itself,	i.e.	because	it	is	a	key	process	that	controls	homeostasis.	It	is	its	role	within	the	developing	and	adult	organism	that	led	to	the	formulation	of	the	concept	by	Kerr	et	al.	in	their	(1972);	similarly,	it	is	the	discovery	of	its	highly	controlled	nature	and	conservation	of	the	
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genetic	sequences	of	the	components	of	the	apoptotic	pathway	across	animals,	as	well	as	the	realisation	of	the	close	relation	between	apoptosis	and	the	immune	system	and	cancer	that	followed	the	molecular	genetic	discoveries	of	the	1980s	and	1990s,	that	gave	it	the	central	prominence	it	deservedly	has	today	as	a	biological	phenomenon.	To	put	the	point	differently,	what	we	think	the	story	of	apoptosis	shows,	is	the	following:	in	the	world	there	are	causal	pathways	for	various	phenomena;	all	causal	pathways	can	be	deemed	mechanisms	in	our	truly	minimal	sense;	but	not	all	those	causal	pathways	are	biologically	interesting	or	signi?icant,	even	if	they	occur	frequently	within	organisms.	Biologically	interesting	or	signi?icant	causal	pathways	are	those	pathways	that	subserve	a	central	function	within	the	organism;	that	is,	whether	a	causal	pathway	is	biologically	interesting	has	to	do	with	features	external	to	the	pathway	itself.		 This	does	not	imply	that	what	is	biologically	interesting	is	something	subjective.	Rather,	it	implies	that	it	is	directly	related	to	biological	practice:	what	the	community	of	biologists	regards	as	the	basic	phenomena	that	must	be	explained	in	order	to	have	both	biological	understanding	and	apply	our	knowledge	clinically.	Thus	we	could	say	that	what	makes	a	causal	pathway	a	speci?ically	biological	mechanism	is	not	something	internal	to	the	pathway	itself;	rather,	it	concerns	the	role	of	that	pathway	within	the	organism.	In	other	words,	whether	a	causal	pathway	is	considered	a	biological	mechanism	by	biologists,	has	to	do	with	a	relational	property	of	the	pathway.	In	the	case	of	apoptosis,	this	relational	property	is	the	homeostatic	function	that	it	subserves.	This	relational	property	is	the	difference	between	a	causal	pathway	like	apoptosis	and	a	causal	pathway	such	as	oncosis.		 However,	suppose	one	were	to	argue	as	follows.	We	should	certainly	let	biological	practice	itself	decide	what	we	should	mean	by	a	‘mechanism’	in	a	biological	context.	If	practice	has	it	that	a	causal	pathway	is	deemed	a	mechanism	by	an	appeal	to	external	features	of	the	pathway,	so	be	it.	TMM	(the	point	would	be)	is	false,	since		
(P-TMM):	mechanism=causal	pathway	+X,	where	X	is	some	biologically	signi?icant	external	feature	of	the	causal	pathway.	
	 Now,	if	one	were	to	argue	like	this,	we	would	not	seriously	object.	We	are	ready	to	accept	that	there	may	well	exist	features	external	to	a	particular	causal	pathway,	and	in	particular	features	that	can	be	established	by	looking	at	biological	practice,	which	
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determine	whether	a	speci?ic	theory-described	causal	pathway	counts	as	a	biological	
mechanism.	But,	in	our	view,	this	attribution	of	‘mechanism’	to	certain	causal	pathways	and	perhaps	not	to	others	would	entail	that	‘mechanism’	is	an	honori?ic	term	attached	to	causal	pathways	that	have	certain	(external)	features.	The	further	scienti?ic	question	then	is	whether	there	is	evidence	that	a	causal	pathway	is	a	‘mechanism’	in	this	sense	or	not.			 In	our	view,	the	choice	between	TMM	and	P-TMM	is	not	particularly	signi?icant:	to	adopt	P-TMM	is	to	claim	that	we	allow	a	distinction	between	a	causal	pathway	for	a	phenomenon	P	and	a	speci?ically	biological	mechanism,	where	the	difference	between	the	two	concerns	an	external	feature	of	the	respective	causal	pathways.	Be	that	as	it	may,	the	important	point	is	that	both	views	are	licensed	by	methodological	mechanism:	to	be	committed	to	either	option,	one	need	not	be	committed	to	some	metaphysical	view	about	causation	or	the	ontology	of	mechanisms.	There	is	no	need	to	do	this	in	order	to	understand	scienti?ic	practice.		 Could	someone	insist	that	there	is	some	other	feature	that	differentiates	a	causal	pathway	from	a	mechanism?	A	possibility	here	is	to	adopt	the	requirement	of	causal	modularity	(cf.	Woodward	2002).	Causal	modularity	may	be	seen	as	the	criterion	that	determines	whether	a	process	counts	as	machine-like	or	not;	so,	perhaps	‘mechanism’	should	be	used	only	for	causal	processes	that	exhibit	causal	modularity.	While	modularity	can	be	important	in	many	cases	as	a	requirement	for	a	causal	representation	of	a	system	(this	is	the	robust	form	of	methodological	mechanism	we	mentioned	in	the	beginning),	the	major	disadvantage	of	this	view	is	that	many	instances	of	‘mechanisms’	in	biology	turn	out	not	to	be	such,	since	they	are	not	modular;	apoptosis	is	a	case	in	point	(cf.	Cassini	2016).	So,	adopting	this	view	necessitates	abandoning	taking	scientists’	talk	of	mechanisms	at	face	value.	Lastly,	consider	again	the	worry	mentioned	in	section	3,	according	to	which	not	every	mechanism	is	a	causal	pathway,	since	there	may	exist	‘inactivated’	mechanisms.	Suppose	examples	of	cases	of	‘mechanisms	without	activities’	are	cases	of	‘mechanisms’	that	instead	of	producing	a	change	maintain	stability	(cf.	Illari	&	Williamson	2012).	It	should	then	be	clear	that	homeostatic	mechanisms	within	cells	that	prevent	apoptosis	do	involve	causal	pathways	(e.g.	the	causal	pathway	in	which	anti-apoptotic	proteins	bind	to	pro-apoptotic	ones).	So,	a	causal	pathway	need	not	result	in	a	speci?ic	change;	its	end-result	may	well	be	the	maintaining	of	a	stable	state.	
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7.	Conclusions	Most	philosophical	accounts	of	mechanisms	offer	‘in?lated’	accounts	of	what	mechanisms	are,	raising	questions	about	the	ontology	of	mechanisms	that	seem	not	necessary	in	order	to	understand	scienti?ic	practice.	In	contrast	to	such	accounts,	in	this	paper	we	have	defended	a	de?lationary	account	of	mechanisms:	according	to	what	we	called	Truly	Minimal	Mechanism,	a	mechanism	just	is	a	causal	pathway	that	produces	a	particular	effect.	Moreover,	we	claimed	that	commitment	to	mechanism	in	science	means	adopting	a	certain	methodological	postulate,	i.e.	that	one	should	always	look	for	the	causal	pathways	producing	the	phenomena	of	interest.	As	such,	it	does	not	make	any	general	ontological	assertions	about	the	nature	of	causal	processes.		We	used	the	example	of	apoptosis	to	show	that	several	distinctions	used	by	biologists	in	order	to	differentiate	between	causal	pathways	and	identify	the	genuine	biological	mechanisms	(active	vs.	passive,	programmed	vs.	non-programmed,	physiological	vs.	accidental)	do	not	correspond	to	internal	features	of	causal	pathways,	but	concern	an	external	feature,	i.e.	the	role	those	processes	play	within	the	organism.		What	the	case	of	apoptosis	shows,	then,	is	that	a	truly	minimal	understanding	of	mechanisms	is	all	that	is	needed	in	order	to	understand	biological	practice.	
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	For	a	view	along	similar	lines,	consider	this	quotation	from	Brandon	(1990,	185,	emphasis	added):	“A	1causal/mechanical	explanation	is	one	that	explains	the	phenomenon	of	interest	in	terms	of	the	mechanisms	that	produced	the	phenomenon.	What	is	a	mechanism?	…	[T]his	question	has	no	general	metaphysical	answer,	because	the	business	of	science	is	the	discovery	of	mechanisms;	so	we	cannot	delimit	in	any	a	priori	manner	the	mechanisms	of	nature.	…	The	best	we	can	do	is	to	give	an	open-ended	answer:	a	mechanism	is	any	describable	causal	process”.		Let	us	also	note	here	in	passing	that	in	the	recent	literature	on	mechanisms,	mechanisms	are	very	often	2regarded	as	speci?ic	kinds	of	systems.	We	think	that	this	is	misleading,	since	mechanisms	and	systems	are	different	things:	mechanisms	on	our	view	are	causal	pathways,	and	it	is	strange	to	call	a	causal	pathway	a	‘system’	(see	also	Oulis	2010).
 For	example,	here	is	how	Virchow	in	the	19th	century	describes	necrosis	in	Cellular	Pathology:	“In	3necrosis	we	conceive	the	morti?ied	[gangrenous]	part	to	be	preserved	more	or	less	in	its	external	form”	(quoted	in	Majno	&	Joris	1995,	3-4).	However,	see	Proskuryakov	&	Gabai	(2010)	for	the	argument	that	necrosis	can	in	certain	cases	be	4considered	as	an	active	and	well-regulated	process.
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